S. Szamado

The paper shows that moderate diversity in activation thresholds promotes cooperation in Threshold Public Good Games across various parameters.

This study investigates the evolutionary dynamics of quorum sensing in microbial cooperation, showing that cue-based signaling resists cheating and promotes cooperation under various environmental conditions.

The paper refutes the Handicap Principle by showing that honest signals can have any cost value, including negative, without requiring costly signaling at equilibrium.

This study conducts a human laboratory experiment to test whether condition-dependent signaling trade-offs or equilibrium signal costs maintain honest communication, finding trade-offs have a greater impact.

This study investigates how reputation systems support cooperation in social dilemmas, finding that scarcity and non-direct benefit earning enhance reputation credibility.

This paper uses a game theoretical model to show that short-range signals can be evolutionarily stable by promoting honest communication of aggressive intent through improved distance estimation.

The paper develops a kin demographic selection model to show that honest begging in offspring increases survival by reducing food variance and improving parental decision-making in asexual populations.

The paper shows that honest signaling in parent-offspring conflicts can result from costs proportional to offspring fitness gain, not just parent fitness loss, challenging the uniqueness of cost functions in signaling theory.

The paper uses a demographic model to show that a rule encouraging resource allocation to post-fertile parents can spread through Darwinian competition despite reducing fertility rates of parents.